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1 Introduction
Since the late 1970s, the story ofVietnam has been
one of dramatic change. lt has not been driven,
however, by the general prescription of most neo-
classical analysts, who hold that large-scale and
quick liberalisation is required in order to launch a
whole package of reforms before opposition can
build up (see, for example, Kreuger 1978). Rather,
the Vietnamese leadership has approached eco-
nomic and institutional change on an incremental
and graduated basis ('step-by-step' in the official
nomenclature). The next step, if it is taken, will
depart from incrementalism and will involve not a
step, but the kind of great leap that would please
neo-classical thinkers.
The great leap would involve the dismantling of all
barriers to Vietnam's integration into the global
economic and trading community A very major
step in this direction is scheduled to occur in 2006,
when Vietnam's full membership in the Asian Free
Trade Area (AFTA) will come into effect. At that
point, all tariffs relating to regional trade must be
reduced to 5 per cent or lower. A second major step
will occur when Vietnam achieves its announced
objective of becoming a full member of the World
Trade Organisation. For an economy still largely
regulated by the state and insulated from external
competition by an extensive range of subsidies,
government-imposed regulations and other policy
instruments, there can be no doubt that the conse-
quences and implications of these steps will be far
more extensive and permanent than all the coun-
try's previous steps towards liberalisation.
Not surprisingly, the prospect of all of this is pro-
ducing in Vietnam an intellectual and political tur-
moil, which is greatly exacerbated by the economic
and financial meltdown that has been occurring in
the surrounding states of East Asia. The internal
debate, however, appears to be less ideologically
driven than might be expected, given the country's
background. To be sure, there are questions of state
control and frequent expressions of profound con-
cern about the social inequities of fully capitalist
societies. For the most part, however, the debate,
even at the highest levels of the Communist Party,
seems to centre not on whether to liberalise further
or open the economy to the competitive forces of
globalisation, but rather on how fast to do so. The
credence of this interpretation of what is
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happening is increased by the fact that it is exactly
this concern with the rate, and not the direction, of
change that has been the hallmark of Vietnam's
reform (doi moi) process since the late 1970s.
The general intent, therefore, does not appear to be
in doubt. What also appears to be clear is the cen-
trality that will be accorded to industrial policy or
(more appropriately termed in today's world) sci-
ence and technology policy The formulation most
often stated in official government documents and
in the speeches of the national leadership is 'to
apply science and technology as the driving forces
for Vietnam's economic development in order to
become a modernised and industrialised society by
the year 2020', The general idea that appears to
guide this formulation at most senior levels is the
path that the Asian NICs adopted some 25 years
ago: gradually moving up the technological ladder
in industrial production to penetrate international
markets.
Given this thinking, the next stages in Vietnamese
policy and the speed of further reforms are likely to
be strongly influenced by the national (i.e. state-
directed) Science and Technology (S&T) strategy
which the government proposes to announce before
the end of 1998. The value of even having such a
strategy is certain to attract critical comment.
2 Why a national S&T policy -
arguments against
In recent years, there has been considerable debate
as to whether there is, in fact, a role for national
S&T or national industrial policies. Starting in the
1980s in industrial countries, it has been argued
that national S&T policies have become obsolete.
The argument goes as follows. National S&T poli-
cies are designed to provide advantage to a national
economy by creating and facilitating a competitive
edge for the goos and services produced within
the borders of the nation. A giobalised trading
arrangement means not only that goods, business
and finance move in an unrestricted manner across
national borders, but that science and technology
also move in the same manner. Thus, any possible
benefits from national S&T policies will quickly
move (leak) outside the individual country and
such policies are, therefore, doomed to failure in a
globalised world.
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In its extreme form, the argument against national
S&T policy goes further. It generally accepts as
desirable national policies for macro-economic sta-
bility (e.g. exchange rate policies, fiscal balance).
Beyond such fundamentals, however, the argument
against holds that, rather than facilitating a national
competitive edge, national S&T policy actually pre-
vents development from occurring. Effective S&T
decisions, it is argued, can only be made at the level
of the individual company or firm: approaches to
S&T must be entirely flexible in order to take
advantage of rapid technological change; and
national (i.e. government) policies are necessarily
rigid and run counter to the interests of develop-
ment. Again starting in the 1980s, it was widely
asserted that this same argument against national
S&T applied to developing countries. Open bor-
ders, liberalisation and privatisation were strongly
recommended. Such measures as industrial strategy
and S&T policies were frowned upon as counter-
productive and wasteful.
3 Why a national S&T policy -
arguments for
There are also strong arguments in support of the
role that S&T Policy can play in national economic
development. First, and perhaps most significantly,
the strong argument of the past 15 years against
national S&T policy is itself undergoing modifica-
tion as a result of new evidence. For example, the
World Bank (1997), following extensive examina-
tion, concluded that the role of national policy is
critical to establishing the conditions for develop-
ment that go beyond those which the market itself
is likely to create. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Bank is explicit on the imperative for poorer coun-
tries of building up the appropriate human capital
and fine-tuning the complex relationship between
the market and society In this regard, the Bank
observes that the experience of the East Asian tigers,
as well as the failures of national efforts elsewhere,
lend strong support to the need for appropriate
instruments of modernisation, including national
S&T strategy instruments.
Secondly, the investments that go with globalisa-
tion, and on which the latter depends, have proven
to be directed by firms and companies not only to
those locations where the comparative advantage is
one of low-cost labour, but more often to
areas where particular strengths exist in S&T. For
example, companies will invest in research in one
country, in industrial design and engineering devel-
opment in another, production in a third, initial
sales in a fourth and after-sales service networks
headquartered in a fifth. Long-term national poli-
cies and actions, particularly in Asia, have been
shown to be critical in attracting and retaining such
investments.
Thirdly, and of great significance is the fact that, if
the strength of globalïsation is in its wealth-creating
capacity, its weakness, if undirected and uncon-
trolled, is being shown to lie in its disregard for and
damage to the environment and its exacerbation of
gross inequalities, both within and between
nations. In Japan, such negative consequences are
increasingly defined as evidence of market failure as
they affect deleteriously such national purposes as
social cohesion, reasonable equity and political
stability
4 Why an S&T policy review
Given the above, it is not surprising that an increas-
ing number of governments, business associations
and communities are assigning importance to dis-
covering arrangements which will provide direct
support to the production, access and mastery of
S&T. A number of approaches and methodologies
have emerged, including, for example, those which
build scenarios and those directed to technology
foresight.
A further such approach that attempts to assist in
arriving at an appropriate S&T policy framework
involves an S&T policy review. Vietnam's deputy
prime minister, Dr Pham Dia Khiem, expressed his
preference for this approach and he, accordingly,
requested and commissioned an S&T policy review
for Vietnam.' The approach followed in such
reviews is highly pragmatic, is predicated on the
assumption that S&T policy must be made in and
adapted to local conditions, and takes the intimate
involvement of national leadership as a prerequi-
site. The essential features of such a review are:
The assembling of a multi-national team of S&T
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policy professionals, from both developed and
developing countries, whose task it is to bring
multiple experiences and diverse perspectives to
bear on the examination of national S&T policy
and practice.
The assessment and sharing of prior experiences
and the lessons that may be learned from these.
This may involve preparation by the country
requesting the review of an assessment of S&T
policy, including its history, evolution over time,
current characteristics, evaluation of its perfor-
mance, and a presentation of any major changes
that are being contemplated.
A substantive national assessment by the inter-
national team of the strengths, weaknesses and
performance of stated policy from the perspec-
tives of its principal stakeholders (government
agencies, research institutes, universities, techni-
cal institutes, national and international
investors, multinational and national compa-
nies, joint-venture operations SMEs, interna-
tional development organisations, etc.). Thus,
the central feature of an S&T policy review is
that it attempts to capture and distil the experi-
ences, assessments and views held of national
policy and to engage in dialogue (to provide a
mirror) regarding those experiences and those
from other parts of the world.
The juxtaposition, open examination, debate
and bringing together of national views, obser-
vations and recommendations (obtained from
government, scientists, technicians and the busi-
ness community) and those of the international
team of policy professionals.
5 The S&T policy review
During three weeks in September and October of
1997, I had the honour to lead an international
S&T policy review mission to Vietnam. We trav-
elled to different parts of the country and met with
some 70 organisations, institutions, departments,
firms and associations, and some 320 Vietnamese
science and technology policymakers, policy imple-
menters and those affected by the policies. Their
views were solicited on all aspects of policy and
practice affecting the economy, investment, science,
technology and innovation, We also examined an
Financing was provided by the Canadian endorsement by the Government of Vietnam, the full
International Development Agency and the International report will be published during 1998.
Development Research Centre. Pending final
extensive range of available literature. A report of
our findings, observations and suggestions was sub-
sequently prepared and widely distributed within
Vietnam, including to all those with whom we had
held discussions. Four months later, in February
1998, we returned to Hanoi where our report was
the subject of a comprehensive two-day workshop
involving approximately 250 senior Vietnamese
stakeholders.
The final report of the international team extends to
over loo pages and the intent here is not to try to
provide a summary of the dozens of observations
and recommendations that it contains, many of
which are, in any event, of a rather situation-spe-
cific nature. Among the questions that the deputy
prime minister asked, and which he requested we
address specifically in our report, were several
which lie at the core not only of Vietnam's current
debate about the speed of further reforms, but
which are central to most of today's discourse on
development. It is these questions that I would like
to address briefly in what follows. The questions
posed were:
What are the factors that Vietnam needs to con-
sider in deciding how to confront the forces of
globalisation?
If Vietnam is to profit from the current techno-
logical revolution, is there an appropriate road
map for technology transfer and what will this
mean for S&T policy, wages, benefits and the
national commitment to social equity?
Can the export-led industrialisation models of
South Korea, Taiwan and other East Asian states
be replicated successfully?
6 Globalisation: factors to
consider
There is, of course, much debate about globalisa-
tion, but few serious observers doubt that it is cre-
ating a porous world where the boundaries that had
long been assumed are fast decreasing in signifi-
cance. Among the strategic factors associated with
globalisation are:
Deregulation, of which the core element is the
abolition of national controls over the cross-bor-
der movement of capital, has been occurring on
an accelerating basis throughout the world.
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has expanded
dramatically and consistently over the past 15
years and the trend is expected to continue. EDI
exerts pressure on regulatory regimes as interna-
tional investors seek out low tax jurisdictions.
FDI in developing countries has exploded in the
last five years, although it remains highly con-
centrated in a few countries, whereas public
financing for development (ODA) has stagnated
and even declined.
Trade liberalisation, particularly evident in the
reduction and elimination of tariffs, has become
the dominant issue in international economic
relations.
Financial markets, especially all of the major
ones, have become tightly integrated, a trend
which will continue. As has become all too evi-
dent in the East Asian events of late 1997, finan-
cial markets exercise the most sensitive and
comprehensive influences on national policies.
These influences are continuous, not episodic.
Financial markets regard each country as pre-
senting a total package of factors which the mar-
kets monitor closely, and any change (from
macro-economic policy to labour legislation or
expenditure plans) can produce a significant
market reaction. The most obvious result is that
macro-economic policies (monetary, fiscal and
expenditure plans) are increasingly
homogenised and the possibilities for experi-
mentation almost non-existent. This is a partic-
ularly important point in that the kinds of
macro-economic experimentation in support of
industrialisation and export-led growth that
were available to South Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan during the 1960-90 period may no
longer be possible for new aspirants.
The fault lines between rich and poor are shift-
ing. Globalisation is producing new gains and
losses, new winners and losers. The dividing line
that was once assumed to exist between the
affluent and industrial North and the poorer
South is fading into history
Income distribution in almost all parts of the
world is becoming more skewed with larger per-
centages of wealth concentrated with the most
privileged 10 per cent of populations and with
declining percentages of wealth being available
to the bottom 20 per cent of the income scale.
Vietnam is a nation which has placed a high
value on equity as a fundamental issue of
socialist principle. The integration of the nation
with globalisation will probably challenge the
extent to which that value can be preserved and
protected.
Management of the global economy must now
be on a supranational basis, but the existing
international institutions established over
decades to deal with growing global interdepen-
dence are being found wanting.
A key factor of globalisation is the fact that com-
panies increasingly have global strategies, and
states increasingly adapt their taxation systems,
labour laws, health and safety regulations, envi-
ronmental laws, etc., in order to take account of
this.
It is now clear that we are entering a qualitatively
new phase in the international system and that this
new phase involves a future that cannot as yet be
clearly visualised. This increases greatly the uncer-
tainties with which S&T policy or strategy must
contend and the risks of policy failure. Vietnam's
decision to join with the forces of globalisation will
necessarily narrow the range of policy choices avail-
able to the government and will involve for its pol-
icymakers the delicate business of working out how
the global economy will impact on various kinds of
national social formation.
7 Technological revolution:
meaning for S&T policy, wages
and social equity
Behind the force of globalisation is a technological
revolution which is altering fundamentally and rad-
ically all aspects of business, industry and manufac-
turing. At its core are the new information and
communications technologies (ICTs). Their revolu-
tionary effects lie in the fact that they are influenc-
ing all other sectors and that they are changing the
very nature of industry, economy and society They
have already resulted in vast improvements in tech-
nical performance, as well as dramatic falls in costs
and a counter-inflationary trend in prices. In brief,
a complete reorganisation of the production system
is now taking place and the reinvention of the very
basis of manufacturing and industry is intensifying.
Among the many implications of these dramatic
shifts for a national S&T policy, there are two that
may be mentioned here:
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Flexible approaches and a relatively open frame-
work are most likely required. Industrial plan-
ning with specific targeting has been the
preferred S&T policy approach of many coun-
tries, but it would appear to be more appropri-
ate and likely to produce success under the old
paradigm than under the new. A good rule in
S&T policy decision-making today is probably
to consider the structure of the whole process in
relation to the goal of the project, and in partic-
ular to integrate decisions on investment, pro-
duction and marketing with decisions on
research and development (R&D). What this
would entail for scïence policy decision-making
or for R&D decision-making would be the con-
stant development of technical and economic
forecasts as integral to decision-making itself.
Government was the critical actor and played a
central and directive role in bringing about
development through industrialisation in
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. The new
paradigm suggests, however, that guidance and
direction may now be more appropriately and
effectively exercised through a gentler touch
based, as Freeman (1992) suggests, on mastery
of an inspired vision of an industrial society and
on its communication.
Development theory in the 1960s held that tech-
nology transfer was the key to economic and social
development. Circumstances have changed, but
there are lessons that can be extracted from this pre-
vious experience. Proprietorship over technology is,
if anything, stronger today than it was three decades
ago. S&T policy needs to take this carefully into
account and to seek the appropriate policy instru-
ments to ensure that the technological packages
obtained accord with the national interest.
Secondly, the foundations that support and encour-
age a continuous process of innovation are of criti-
cal importance (more so today than in the past) and
must be integral to S&T policy
Experience and research over the period 1960-80
also showed that a developing country wishing to
establish new export-oriented industries and new
areas of R&D work usually began from a position of
disadvantage relative to established industrial coun-
tries and leading firms. This gave rise to infant
industry policies. Although the approaches varied
somewhat, infant industry practices were key
components of the strategies of Singapore, Taiwan,
South Korea and Brazil. Infant industry approaches
are continuing today, but the much more integrated
global economy and the speed and sweep of the
technological revolution mean that the instruments
used must be considerably more subtle and flexible
than in the past.
A further factor which emerges clearly from recent
cases where new technologies have been turned to
national advantage is that international access to
innovations and know-how is central. This does not
diminish the role that national R&D may play, but
the experiences of Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea
and Indonesia make it clear that international con-
nectivity is imperative.
It is also clear from the experiences of South-east
Asian countries that the transition from the initial
stage in their industrialisation, involving cheap
labour and labour-intensive manufacturing, to skill-
based competitiveness in manufacturing involved a
difficult and delicate process. South Korea made the
transition after years of fast productivity growth but
relatively stagnant wages. When it initially attempted
the transition in the early 1 980s, labour costs began
to rise. Until 1988, productivity and the demand for
labour continued to increase and the transition to a
higher-wage, skill-based economy appeared to be
going smoothly In 1989 and 1990, however, a wage
explosion dramatically increased labour share in the
value added, and expansion in the number of
employees came to a halt (Godfrey 1997).
In the case of Singapore, by the late 1970s severe
labour shortages were appearing. At the same time,
the government concluded that the wage restraint
policy of previous years had promoted the retention
of labour-intensive economic activities, hindering
the natural process of economic restructuring and
making the economy more vulnerable to interna-
tional competition from other developing countries.
Thus, in 1979-84, the government encouraged sig-
nificant wage increases. The impact, however,
weighed most heavily upon firms engaged in
labour-intensive activities and the overall result was
that employment in Singapore's manufacturing sec-
tor actually fell between 1982 and 1986, while
labour costs rose, This was not reversed until 1986,
following the abandonment of the centralised
high-wage policy (Beng 1997).
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The lessons here are not only that wage policy is
integral to a successful S&T strategy, but also that
wage policy has proved to be difficult to manage
well, especially in up-scaling to skill-intensive
manufacturing.
8 Can rapid development through
export-led industrialisation be
replicated?
The short answer is 'probably yes, but it will be
more difficult than in the past'. Interpretations of
the successes in East Asia usually emphasise the
importance of domestic factors, in particular estab-
lishing the 'right' policies; but more critical assess-
ment shows that a good part of the reason for East
Asian success had to do with international factors
(Wade 1990). The countries that were able to seize
these opportunities were generally those which had
already established an industrial base through pre-
vious policies of import substitution, had invested
heavily in basic education and which also had
determined governments committed to the strong
management of an industrialisation process by the
state. The external factors that exist today are vastly
different from those that applied when the East
Asian tigers penetrated international markets. There
has been a dramatic fall in the demand for unskilled
labour and raw materials per unit of industrial pro-
duction. Tariff barriers maybe falling, but quantita-
tive barriers (non-tarifO have increased with special
discrimination against developing countries.
There has been, in addition, a sharp increase in the
volatility of the international economy, and there-
fore much more uncertainty The internationalisa-
tion and deregulation of financial markets and the
opening of capital accounts have given rise to
unprecedented flows of short-term money, in
amounts up to 80-100 times bigger than trade
flows. Relationships between exchange rates and
trade, interest rates and investment, and fiscal and
monetary policies have become unhinged. Short-
term flows have dwarfed long-term investments.
Recent events in Asia confirm this volatility The
currency and financial crises in Thailand, Malaysia,
South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines have
greatly complicated the regional scene and added
major uncertainties about the future. Conflicting
interpretations, explanations, accusations and
counter-accusations of what has happened abound.
What has been clearly established by the downturn
in the fortunes of these tigers, however, is that if the
potential benefits of financial integration and
private capital are large, so are the risks. The speed
and magnitude of market reaction is an integral part
of financial integration. The effects of the current
crisis will almost certainly be felt in the region for
many years and this must be expected to make the
regional and global integration of Vietnam more
difficult.
In addition, Japan, with the region most powerful
economy, has moved into a period of low growth,
with the strong possibility of a prolonged recession.
And, finally, China recent policy announcement
that unprofitable state-owned enterprises will no
longer receive financial support from the state is
likely to mean the availability of a vast reserve of
low-cost skilled and semi-skilled workers who will,
it must be expected, compete aggressively with the
efforts of other countries in the region to attract
investment, particularly for entry-level, labour-
intensive manufacturing.
9 Implications for a Vietnamese
S&T strategy
The implications of all of this for countries like
Vietnam wishing to follow the previous East Asian
miracle economies are numerous. First and fore-
most, there is a clear place and requirement for
S&T policy Far from being rendered irrelevant to
success in a globalised order, the evidence suggests
strongly that such policy is probably more impor-
tant than before. Second, globalisation will replace
tariff barriers with non-tariff barriers that are
directed especially at light manufactured goods,
precisely the products which countries like Vietnam
are urged to make their principal export sectors.
This will increase the difficulties and barriers to
entry at the lower end of the value chain. Third, a
new set of policy arrangements will be required to
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establish and link to national and international sys-
tems of innovation. Included here would be subtle
and flexible instruments that facilitate careful co-
ordination of trade and financial liberalisation with
technological and industrial change. Fourth, recent
events mean that Vietnam will confront increased
competition from the existing East Asian tigers
which, having lost much ground in recent months,
must now be expected simultaneously to push for
expansion into the most advanced sectors while
using technology to remain competitive in light
manufactures, Fifth, the huge, low-cost, surplus
labour pool that may soon be created in China
implies that the prospects for Vietnamese growth
through export-led manufactures are now much
more complicated.
Faced with these new opportunities and dangers, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the policïes that
created the previous miracles of East Asia will not
work as well or even as easily as they did in the
past. The less favourable and more complex condi-
tions internationally are likely sufficient in them-
selves to confirm this assessment. This does not
mean that new policy should not take careful
account of what occurred previously in East Asia,
for that would be a serious mistake. What it does
mean, however, is that there is almost certainly no
model available for Vietnam to meet its intent to
become an industrial society within a little over two
decades. What it also likely means is that an appro-
priate set of S&T policy instruments, tightly imbed-
ded into, complemented by and complementary to
a broad range of other economic, industrial and
social instruments will be more important and crit-
ical than before. Finally, it means that a sound S&T
policy framework must perforce contend with
much greater complexity and uncertainty than was
the case in even the very recent past, and must seek
to facilitate arrangements that contain sufficient
flexibility and agility to respond to circumstances
that change and assumptions that prove to be
unfounded.
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